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SISTERS OF THE CALIPHATE: MEDIA AND  
THE WOMEN OF ISIS
Kathleen German 
Rosemary Pennington
Women have long been viewed as the “weaker sex”–more peace-loving and passive than 
men. However, clashes in Sri Lanka and Northern 
Ireland have shown that women are both willing 
and able to participate in violent conflict (Alison, 
2004; Cheldelin & Eliatamby, 2011). In some 
Muslim communities, women have historically 
been excluded from combat through religious 
sanctions as David Cook (2005) notes: “Classical 
Islamic sources are fairly negative about the role of 
women in jihad” (p. 383). Even so, Muslim women 
are increasingly finding their way to battlefields 
and combat zones. This trend first became 
apparent in conflicts in more 
secular Muslim societies such as 
Chechnya and Palestine, but even 
highly conservative Al Qaeda 
(Cook, 2005) and the Islamic 
State (Mironova, 2019, February 
20) have begun to embrace the 
idea of the female fighter.
Katherine Kniep (2016) posits 
that women who are drawn 
to jihad view the calling as 
emancipatory in nature. Miranda 
Alison (2003) confirms this 
conclusion in her study of the 
Tamil Tigers, noting that some 
women joined the group as a way to fight back 
against their oppression at the hands of Sri Lankan 
authorities. The promise of gender equality was 
one reason women joined rebel forces in the 
Eritrean fight for independence (Bernal, 2000), 
while Katarina von Knop (2007) suggests that for 
some female terrorists, engaging violence is an 
exercise of power, a way to escape an oppressive 
society. Escaping oppression may motivate women 
who join ISIS. Rafia Zakaria (2015) writes that:
The “liberation” offered by ISIS can seem 
like an escape from both the ghettoized 
status of Islam in the West as well as the 
restrictive cultural mores of many Muslim 
countries; just as crucially, it can also 
seem like a legitimate response to being 
victimized by U.S.-led wars that promise 
female empowerment but deliver widespread 
destruction. (p. 125)
The perception that Islam itself is under threat also 
serves to motivate some women to join terrorist 
groups (Ali, 2006). Though Western news stories 
about female recruits to ISIS often 
frame them as naive individuals 
duped by deceptive recruiters, 
scholars such as Kniep (2016) 
and Zakaria (2015) argue that, in 
order to understand how women 
are recruited to ISIS, researchers 
must consider how the choice to 
join might seem like a reasonable 
political option for these women. 
Scholars must consider the appeal 
of expanded opportunities to 
women who participate in the 
Islamic State.
Though the experience of women 
during conflict has increasingly 
become an area of focus for scholars, these studies 
often consider women only through the lens 
of victimhood, obscuring their experiences as 
agents, perpetrators, or even active participants. 
Considering the range of women’s participation as 
suicide bombers, front-line soldiers, propagandists, 
and home-front supporters, more nuanced 
approaches should be taken to the study of the 
varied roles of women in conflict. This essay 
“Though the experience of 
women during conflict has 
increasingly become an area of 
focus for scholars, these studies 
often consider women only 
through the lens of victimhood, 
obscuring their experiences as 
agents, perpetrators, or even 
active participants.”
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specifically examines the recruitment to and roles 
of women in the Islamic State. It does so through 
an examination of the scholarship on female 
fighters in order to contextualize the women of 
ISIS. To understand how ISIS targets women, 
we conducted a close textual reading of internet 
recruitment material which provides a basis 
for understanding the ways ISIS has worked to 
convince women to join the Islamic State.1 This 
essay ends with a suggestion that scholars and 
others interested in the experience of women in 
conflict move away from overly simplistic framings 
which suggest women have little to no agency. Our 
essay, and the work of other scholars, suggests the 
opposite. 
THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN ISIS
The departure of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 
introduced instability in the country that allowed 
political corruption and sectarian violence to 
emerge. Taking advantage of the Syrian civil war, 
the group that came to be known as ISIS filled 
the void created by the lack of a viable central 
government or security infrastructure in the region 
(Engel, 2015, February 11; Ghosh, 2014, August 
14; Wood, 2015, March). In 2014 ISIS declared 
its territory a caliphate and fielded approximately 
40,000 fighters, including as many as 30,000 
foreign troops from North Africa, Europe, and the 
United States. By early 2019, ISIS had been driven 
out of a large percentage of its territory, including 
crucial cities like Tikrit, Ramadi, Mosul, and Hajin 
by a coalition of American, European, and Arab 
nations working with the Iraqi army. Analysts 
warn, however, that even with its loss of physical 
territory “...the Islamic State is likely to remain 
a powerful terrorist force” using its vast cyber 
networks to recruit supporters and surge forces as 
needed (Callimachi, 2018, September 12). In fact, 
the Islamic State’s attacks from the areas it had 
seemingly been pushed from actually increased in 
2018 (Giglio, 2018, October 31). However, the 
group’s future does seem a bit murkier. As of this 
writing, reports have begun circulating that Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS’s ailing leader, has handed 
over control of the Islamic State to a successor 
  
(Siegel, 2019, August 22). Whether this new leader 
can sustain a resurgence of the group’s power and 
retake territory remains to be seen.
In the past, as ISIS fighting forces have dwindled, 
recruitment increased, especially through internet 
forums (Hanoush, 2015, November 21; Klausen, 
2015; Melhern, 2015, November/December). 
Women were especially targeted as mothers, 
wives, medical professionals, business operators, 
farmers, and online recruiters spreading the 
message of jihad (Auerbach, 2014). They not have, 
until recently, been used extensively in combat 
as the Qur’an exempts women from the duty to 
participate in armed jihad (Hasan, 2004); women 
have also been prohibited from joining front-line 
fighting by Ayman al-Zawahiri, once Al-Qaeda’s 
second in command and Yussufal-Ayyiri, leader 
of the Saudi organization (Buril, 2017; Cook, 
2005; Lahoud, 2010, February 26). However, there 
has been a resurgence in women’s involvement 
in international terrorist activities in some parts 
of the world (Ali, 2006; Cook, 2005; von Knop, 
2007). Some speculated that the current, more 
desperate position of the caliphate will lead to 
a greater reliance on women in active combat 
roles (Al-Saleh, 2014, January 5; Buril, 2017; 
Speckhard, 2013, September 24). The women who 
might fill those roles have often been recruited 
to the Islamic State via ISIS’s extensive media 
infrastructure.
ISIS MEDIA PRACTICES
In its short but dramatic history, ISIS has made 
newsworthy use of social media for a variety of 
purposes from soliciting financing, recruiting 
fighters, establishing legitimacy, and instilling 
fear in its adversaries. The group has produced 
professional promotional media that are 
distributed in a wide variety of formats including 
online magazines, blogs, internet forums, and 
YouTube videos. And these messages reverberate 
across the internet, spawning others such as the 
“one billion campaign” which calls on Muslims 
to post messages, photos and videos on Twitter, 
Instagram and YouTube in support of ISIS. 
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They also use more informal, but still highly 
orchestrated social media such as initiating a 
Twitter hashtag in Arabic which translates as 
#theFridayofsupportingISIS in which supporters 
wave ISIS flags and upload videos. At its height it 
is estimated that there were some 45,000 active 
ISIS Twitter accounts (Brookings Institution’s 
Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, 
2016). The largest number of followers who access 
ISIS through Twitter are located in Syria and 
Iraq, although one in five ISIS supporters selected 
English as their primary language 
(Berger & Morgan, 2015; Smith, 
2015). Free internet applications 
like The Dawn of Glad Tidings 
automatically post approved 
tweets to the accounts of 
subscribed users, with as many as 
40,000 daily tweets sent on some 
occasions “presumably to create 
fear among its enemies and win 
the admiration of other radical 
groups” (Irshaid, 2014). 
In order to compete effectively 
for the attention of viewers who 
are bombarded with hundreds of other messages, 
ISIS videos were shortened from 53 minutes to 
an average of 20 minutes suggesting a sensitivity 
to a generation of consumers fluent in digital 
technologies and impatient with lengthy visuals 
(Bolt, 2012). Videos also mimic popular video 
games like Grand Theft Auto and Call of Duty by 
using first person point-of-view and rapid editing 
to create immersion in alternative reality. The 
video images are ambiguous and fluid, allowing 
disparate and diverse receivers to construct their 
own identities around them (Bolt, 2012; Graber, 
2011). At the same time, as receivers reinterpret 
the images, they incorporate them into their own 
hierarchy of thinking (Garin, 2015, June 11; 
Pepitone 2014, June 16; Stern & Berger, 2015). 
These videos often feature demonstrations of 
strength such as the swift justice meted out to 
enemies through graphic executions which are 
juxtaposed with material communicating ISIS’s 
compassion for the elderly and children. These 
messages position ISIS as a real agent of change 
grounded in social justice that avenges the long-
suffering faithful. To date, counter-messages 
have largely been ineffective because they do 
not address ISIS’s fundamental appeal to justice 
(Cohen, 2009; Mazzetti & Gordon, 2015, June 12; 
Sorenson, 2014; Stevens & Neumann, 2009). 
Although some ISIS online media is generated 
spontaneously by individuals, most messages are 
well-conceptualized productions that sometimes 
strategically mimic poor 
production quality to imply 
grass roots origins (Krona, 2019; 
Siboni, Cohen, & Koren, 2015). 
The mediated messages are 
purposeful, well-financed, and 
carefully choreographed. Footage 
is obtained from ISIS soldiers 
going into battle equipped with 
GoPro cameras strapped to their 
helmets and remotely-operated 
drones flying above the armed 
clashes. Compared to other social 
movements, Julianne Pepitone 
(2014) concludes: “The scale 
and relative professionalism of ISIS’ management 
of social media and other PR platforms has 
been far superior...” The footage is designed to 
work equally well across multiple media formats 
suggesting pre-production planning, professional 
quality production, and post-production 
sophistication with an understanding of the 
confluence of multiple media channels. The overall 
goal of ISIS is to manipulate public sentiment and 
coalesce political-military power via sophisticated 
media that form an important part of its strategy 
of warfare (Conway, 2012; Gates & Podder, 2015; 
Greene, 2015; Huey, 2015, May 25; Kimmage & 
Ridolfo, 2007; Siboni, Cohen, & Koren, 2015). 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNET IMAGES
If seeing is believing, then the internet is an 
archive of belief. Internet communication 
technologies privilege images because they are 
immediate, able to simultaneously communicate 
multiple meanings, and function effectively to 
“The overall goal of ISIS 
is to manipulate public 
sentiment and coalesce 
political-military power via 
sophisticated media that 
form an important part of 
its strategy of warfare.”
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generate common themes that resonate through 
a fragmented media landscape. Visual texts 
are more effective than other message forms in 
communicating ideas (Lester, 2003) and images are 
more likely than other modes of communication 
to result in persuasion as Neville Bolt (2012) 
concludes: “And increasingly it is pictures, images 
triggering crystallised messages that resonate with 
popular memories of grievance and injustice. In 
today’s overcrowded marketplace of ideas and 
communications, they offer clarity... {acting} as a 
lightening rod for collective memory” (p. 7).
The contemporary turn to the visual by 
proponents of marginalized ideas is enhanced by 
information and communication technologies 
that offer the possibility of immediate, relatively 
unimpeded digital sharing with potentially millions 
of participants (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). The 
unique feature of information and communication 
technologies is that they easily conform to 
multiple contexts. This technological adaptability 
accounts, in part, for the rapid rise of ISIS and 
its continuing threat to established governments. 
As Emerson T. Brooking and P. W. Singer (2016, 
November) claim, “The principles that have guided 
the Islamic State’s viral success are the same ones 
used to publicize a new Taylor Swift album or the 
latest Star Wars movie” (p. 76). Information and 
communication technology are cheap and readily 
available. They lend themselves to theatrical 
displays that appeal to younger audiences.
The use of visual images as a strategy of 
contemporary conflict is rooted in the experiences 
of twentieth century world war combatants like 
filmmakers Frank Capra and Leni Reifenstahl 
who exploited the power of visual propaganda 
to communicate national ideologies. More 
recently ‘netwar,’ as observers have labeled it, 
has weaponized digital media and widened the 
battlefront to include the internet. Images of 
conflict, especially those of death, still transfix 
viewers, further illustrating the power of the 
visual image. Such images are characterized by 
fragmentation as well as immediacy. The real 
power of shared images lies in their ability to 
reduce ideas to a single instantly recognized 
experience as Neville Bolt (2012) claims, “it is the 
uncluttered simplicity of the images, stripping out 
any extraneous distraction that might complicate 
the intended message. As reality is transformed 
into iconographic representation, the greater 
chance of prolonging its life and freezing the 
moment forever” (p. 115). Just as images anchor 
public memory and form the cornerstone of 
historical experience, they can also influence an 
individual’s understanding of personal experience, 
providing a cultural way to interpret events in 
the realm of one’s own life. For women, these 
messages are often related to gendered roles as 
sisters, lovers, and mothers.
Images condense the arguments and beliefs of 
abstract ideologies into a single, compelling 
force that functions to convey them as mediated 
spectacles (McGee, 1980; Graber, 2011; Gronbeck, 
2013). As spectacle, images circulated via the 
internet invite participation because of the nature 
of the medium as participants actively choose 
to view, post, re-post, and otherwise interact 
online. These resources engage respondents that 
are more important to revolutionary groups than 
their physical resources because they encourage 
individuals to identify with the ideologies of the 
group (McGee, 1983). For this reason, images are 
a critical element in recruiting and maintaining 
adherents. The shared visual image becomes a 
common denominator in persuasion, condensing 
and transmitting ideological positions. The online 
presence of ISIS illustrates the power of images 
in the successful recruitment of individuals to the 
caliphate and its jihad (Shamieh & Szenes, 2015; 
Walker, 2015; Zelin, 2015). 
ISIS RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN  
More than 41,000 Westerners reported to have 
joined the Islamic State, with more than 4,700 
of them being women (Ulas, 2019, August 
15). Stories of individuals traveling to join the 
caliphate form the basis of speculation about 
recruitment but often there is little other evidence 
of why recruitment succeeded (van San, 2017). 
Because Western governments have become more 
active in pursuing and shutting down online 
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recruitment sites, it is also more difficult to trace 
what media are accessed and how frequently 
viewers participate in those media. In particular, 
ISIS works to produce what are known as 
“swarmcasts,” which are multi-platformed, 
multi-modal, multi-sourced social media events 
that are difficult to counter. Swarmcasts have 
stretched traditional definitions of media as 
Ali Fisher (2015) observes: “It marks a shift 
from the hierarchical and broadcast models of 
communication during conflict to a new dispersed 
and resilient form which embraces the strength of 
emergent behaviour” (p. 8). 
At the height of its online power, ISIS had at least 
a vast media operation pumping out video, audio, 
and written material (Krona, 2019). Many of these 
were clearly produced by sources familiar with 
Western language and culture. It is probable that 
Western women were partially involved in the 
creation of materials aimed at girls and women 
because of the colloquial content as well as the 
strict gender segregation within ISIS organizations. 
Materials targeting these women, sometimes 
feature fighters with kittens or other homey images 
designed to make them seem approachable and 
reinforce the idea that ISIS fighters are fueled not 
only by righteousness but also by compassion. 
These impressions are then used to craft romantic 
appeals to female recruits, suggesting ISIS will 
protect them and defend them against injustices
The recruitment of teen girls, in particular, serves 
several purposes. First, it is less likely that girls will 
be apprehended as they travel to the Islamic State 
because they raise fewer suspicions; second, these 
girls are expected to marry ISIS fighters and raise a 
new generation of caliphate members; and, finally, 
Western girls can be used to stage terrorist attacks 
in their own countries. The original call for girls 
to migrate to the caliphate was highly effective 
as Sash Havlicek, chief executive of the Institute 
for Strategic Dialogue, observes: “We’re seeing 
young women from across Western countries 
both expressing their support for and migrating 
to Syria now in totally unprecedented numbers. 
And I would say this is the result really of an 
extremely sophisticated propaganda recruitment 
machinery that’s targeting young women very 
specifically” (Quoted in Perrucci, 2015). At the 
height of its recruitment, it is estimated that 10% 
of foreigners voluntarily entering the Islamic State 
were women as ISIS actively increased its appeal to 
young, computer literate women (Khelghat-Doost, 
2017). The caliphate offered a utopian political 
vision with centralized Islamic rule that resonated 
with youthful religious idealism and desire to 
escape the frustrations of daily life in the West 
(Perrucci, 2015). Young recruits were assured by 
ISIS bloggers that the caliphate was determined 
to help its citizens. ISIS publications such as 
Dabiq emphasized the caliphate’s commitment to 
producing a just civil society. The caliphate was 
framed as an idyllic alternative to marginalized 
young people living in countries where they were 
often subjected to Islamophobic harassment.
ISIS messages gain potency because they are 
disseminated via social media that mimic personal 
interaction (Shane & Hubbard, 2014, August 30; 
Speckhard, Yayla, & Shajkovci, 2016). As Shahed 
Amanullah, a former senior adviser at the State 
Department, notes, “It’s from the audience that 
it is going after. These young people understand 
youth frustration, they understand the fascination 
with violence, they understand that imagery and 
graphics that you see in Hollywood will attract 
these people.” Compared to counter-narratives 
posted in an attempt to undermine ISIS, the 
government messages “...don’t percolate through 
the Internet in the same way a beheading video 
does” (Walker, 2015). The ISIS messages court the 
undecided by displaying the heroic nature of the 
fighters, strengthen recruit resolve by situating the 
fighting as a defense of daily life, and threaten the 
West by revealing the consequences of resisting 
ISIS’s authority (Garin, 2015, June 11). It is clear 
to Lint Watts of the Foreign Policy Institute that 
social media “accelerate the radicalization of 
recruitment” partially through video imagery, 
immersing potential recruits in an engaging way, 
and through repetition as video messages pop 
up in many places across multiple platforms–
something ISIS has done more successfully than 
any other group (Farwell, 2014; Simon, 2014, 
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September 6; Stern & Berger, 2015).
Women are usually recruited to ISIS by other 
women through internet contacts. Part of the 
appeal is that women can join jihad within 
their traditional religious roles as supporters 
of the movement. They are fully prepared for 
the struggle to advance the cause within the 
prescribed religious boundaries that offer women 
an important way to confront the enemy within 
their gender expectations (Lahoud, 2010, February 
26; Von Knop, 2007; Zamkanei, 2008). There 
are a variety of levels of women’s involvement 
in recruitment, from the creation of pamphlets 
to online training to articles in publications like 
ISIS’s Arabic magazine al-Naba. Some ISIS women, 
such as Iman Mustafa al-Bugha and Umayma al-
Zawahiri, have gained prestige through their social 
media contributions (Lahoud, 2010, February 26).
While the reasons women are attracted to jihad are 
as varied as the women themselves, it appears that, 
unlike men, women’s reasons tend to be personal 
(Grier, 2010, March 10; Weinberg & Eubank, 
2011). New forms of internet communication have 
facilitated more intimate connections between 
individual women and jihadist organizations 
(Weinberg & Eubank, 2011). In fact, specific 
attention has been directed at women by 
recruiting organizations using personal appeals 
(Gonzalez-Perez, 2011). The global nature of the 
internet makes it easy to communicate to a vast 
reservoir of individuals who might otherwise 
not be tapped by traditional media, particularly 
those targeting men. As Margaret Gonzalez-Perez 
(2011) concludes: “Thousands of Al Qaeda’s 
authors and postings appeal specifically to women, 
disseminating propaganda, gathering strategic 
intelligence, and mobilizing female operatives” 
(p. 61). Many of these postings are ephemeral, 
located and shut down quickly, but just as quickly, 
interested women shift to other sites and continue 
to connect with others who promote jihad. 
The ISIS materials aimed at young women and 
teenage girls skirt the more violent realities of 
life in a jihadist culture by establishing strong 
interpersonal contacts. They engage in one-on-
one conversations with recruiters from the same 
country who are similar in age and interests. 
They engage in small talk and colloquialisms 
through internet conversations (Speckhard, 
2013, September 24). This is a strategy dating 
from the early 2000’s. Humera Khan (2004), 
executive director of Muflehun which specializes 
in counter-terrorism, says of extremists online 
“they’re talking about everyday issues, what 
life is like. It’s very warm and fuzzy stuff. Only 
a tiny percent has anything to do with religious 
ideology and a tiny percent has anything to do 
with violence” (p. 63). The overall content of such 
online interaction mixes homey “girltalk” with 
only subtle undercurrents of jihadic messages. This 
is likely not an accident as Debangana Chatterjee 
(2016) has pointed out how this seemingly “warm 
and fuzzy” girltalk masks the violent, oppressive, 
and abusive reality experienced by many women 
living in Islamic State territory. Also obscuring 
the violence of life in ISIS are the romantic 
relationships used to recruit women to the Islamic 
State.
ROMANCING THE CALIPHATE    
The images of Islamic State fighters holding 
kittens or caring for the elderly are not only used 
to suggest to the viewer that the caliphate cares 
about the lives of its residents, but they also hint 
at the romantic relationships that await female 
recruits. A number of ISIS bloggers create fantasy 
narratives  to attract women with suggestive 
storylines, gauzy images, and hidden romances. A 
celebrity culture has even emerged around some 
ISIS fighters popularly called “jihotties” such as the 
French recruit known as “Guitone” and some sites 
offer an online speed dating service for fighters 
looking for jihadi brides (Smith, 2015). This 
attention to finding a romantic partner for female 
ISIS recruits is an attempt to tap into a centuries-
old romantic tradition that exists in some Middle 
Eastern and Central Eurasian cultures. 
Most famous, perhaps, is the strand of romance 
found in Persian poetry, which models the 
relationship between men and women, stressing 
both modest traditional relationships and warning 
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that willful women are the source of social 
disruption (Ispahani, 2016; Newsom-Rascoe, 
2006). Its foundational narratives give centrality 
to women’s roles as symbols in the creation of 
romantic bonds while simultaneously establishing 
women as objects of desire. The centrality of 
women within the romance has recently been 
used for contradictory ends, for the expansion 
of women’s power within Islam and, in direct 
contrast, the restriction of women exclusively 
to family. The source of these narratives springs 
from society and social relationships rooted in 
religion. It is largely religion 
that modulates women’s identity 
within many Muslim cultures, 
solidifying her place of belonging 
and suggesting parameters of 
action and attitudes (Cooke, 
2001). Her role is fraught with 
unsatisfied longing that is deeply 
rooted in religious-secular court 
culture and spirituality. The bond 
between the lover and the beloved 
is at once laden with physical 
yearning and mystical devotion 
that mimics the relationship of 
the devoted to God (Curtis & Canby, 2006). This 
sort of romance, or the history of it, seems at times 
to have inspired the social media posts of ISIS 
“fangirls” – often young Western Muslims – in 
Tumblr and Twitter who have used their spaces 
to sell a narrative of adventure and belonging in 
relation to the Islamic State (Ben-Israel, 2019).
Romance is also an important genre in many 
Western countries. In the United States, for 
example, romance makes up 29%-34% of fiction 
sales, offering up to readers idealized imaginings of 
the relationship between men and women (Nielsen, 
2016, May 26; Romance Writers of America, n.d.).
While the genre can be liberating, some critics 
claim that it reinforces unrealistic and racially 
biased notions of human relationships (The 
Ripped Bodice, n.d.). ISIS media have exploited 
these popular romantic traditions as it has crafted 
recruitment materials aimed at young women, 
offering the possibility of an exciting, but chaste 
romance between the viewer and an ISIS fighter 
(real or imagined) featured in an image or 
described in a post. In particular, the “romance of 
the veil” appears with some frequency. One such 
text showed two imagined lovers engaged in an 
innocent flirtation where a woman plays with a 
wispy veil, eventually pulling it aside for her lover, 
a jihadi fighter, to see her face in full. That is the 
entirety of the interaction. There is nothing overtly 
sexual, although the passage offers intimacy. Such 
encounters may appeal to young women who 
respond to traditional gender roles envisioned in 
popular romances and for whom 
strict gender segregation affords 
limited interaction with men 
(Saul, 2014, October 31). 
A number of other messages 
targeting women, including 
video sermons on the role of 
women in the caliphate, feature 
feminine touches such as roses 
that decorate the title screens. 
Graphics for other videos and 
printed material for women 
also feature various colors such 
as pink or purple that may lend a softer, more 
romantic touch to the text. Such subtle appeals to 
women may reinforce a life of romance, of love, 
and of purpose as viewers fantasize about their 
lives as brides of ISIS fighters. After harsh social 
exclusion in the West, women may be tempted by 
the inclusion offered by romantic and familial love. 
In addition to a focus on romantic love, ISIS media 
also have produced messages which romanticize 
the role of women as jihadi fighters. These are 
not women who need saving by the West (Abu-
Lughod, 2002), but who will, instead, save 
their sisters from Western imperialism. Clad in 
long black niqab and wielding automatic rifles, 
these women support their husbands and sons 
in jihad by offering their own lives to protect 
their homes and communities. No longer is it the 
lone woman who might take up violent means 
in support of a political group, as in the case of 
Roshonara Choudhry who killed a local politician 
after listening to the sermons of a radical cleric 
“ISIS media have exploited … 
popular romantic traditions 
as it has crafted recruitment 
materials aimed at young 
women, offering the possibility 
of an exciting, but chaste 
romance between the viewer 
and an ISIS fighter…”
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(Pearson, 2015); increasingly, ISIS is producing 
visual material showing female fighters working 
together. The message which accompanies such 
images often urges women to take up arms to 
defend the caliphate (Dearden, 2017, October 
6). ISIS, in essence, has empowered its female 
members to join the physical fight. 
This framing of women as empowered female 
fighters is similar to videos produced by the Khayr 
Ummah Foundation, associated with Al Qaeda. 
In one video entitled Empowered Women, a 
group of women in black niqab hold automatic 
rifles, point them into the air, and shoot at distant 
targets. The women cheer one another and shout 
“Allahu Akbar.” The video is meant to juxtapose 
Al Qaeda’s idea of female empowerment with 
Western female empowerment. Al Qaeda’s 
empowered women are armed and ready to defend 
their culture and their families from outside threats 
– who needs a sexual revolution when you have an 
automatic rifle?
Both the ISIS and Al Qaeda visuals show groups of 
women fighting together in worlds circumscribed 
by their relationships with other members of their 
respective groups. Religious messages often build 
on the need for interpersonal reinforcement of a 
romanticized ideal that promises the righting of 
injustices by armed female fighters. The justice 
wrought by such violence is sanctioned by jihad 
and possibly appeals to Western Muslim women 
who have suffered personal oppression (Van 
San, 2018). The fighting women of ISIS (and Al 
Qaeda) offer a romanticized vision of conflict 
showing potential recruits the camaraderie of 
sisters in the shadow of the Black Banner as they 
defend the state and all it stands for. This type of 
framing hides the patriarchal organization which 
sits at the core of Islamic State, as well as the 
violence inherent to it (Chatterjee, 2016; Peresin & 
Cervone, 2015) in order to sell an alternative idea 
of empowerment to women who have sometimes 
felt like they have had little say over the course of 
their lives. 
CONCLUSION
While the fortunes of the Islamic State have 
recently been challenged on the battlefield and the 
final outcome of the struggle is uncertain at the 
time of this writing, ISIS still maintains a vigorous 
media presence and influences periodic ‘lone wolf’ 
attacks (Arango, 2017, March 28; Hubbard & 
Gordon, 2017, March 29). Instead of encouraging 
the physical journey, known as “hijrah” (the 
Arabic reference to Prophet Muhammad’s journey 
to escape persecution) it now offers adherents 
the opportunity to serve Islam by striking at the 
enemy in situ. As Abu Muhammad al-Adnani tells 
followers: “If the tyrants have closed in your faces 
the door of hijrah, then open in their face the door 
of jihad” (Callimachi, 2017). In at least 10 suicide 
bombings, recruits were in direct contact with 
their online coaches until the final minutes of the 
attack. Experts who have examined plots carried 
out in the name of ISIS conclude that for the past 
three years, “enabled attacks” facilitated by online 
applications, such as ChatSecure, Pidgin, Tutanota, 
and the Tails operating system, have grown as ISIS 
recruiters can hide safely among billions of social 
media accounts worldwide, using skillfully crafted 
messages as “clickbait” to lure future recruits 
(Almuhktar, 2015, May 19; Callimachi, 2017). 
As ISIS vows to export the fight to other nations, 
the internet has served as an invaluable tool in 
the radicalization of supporters (Stern & Berger, 
2015). The focus on influencing terrorist attacks 
has altered the dynamics of recruitment as Frank 
Cilluffo (2014), director of the George Washington 
University Homeland Security Policy Institute, 
explains, “At the end of the day, they don’t need 
big numbers. They’re trying to appeal to small 
numbers, which unfortunately in the terrorism 
business is all it takes” (p. 6). Instead of more 
generic appeals, ISIS recruiters can establish 
personal relationships with online contacts, 
providing the motivation and information 
necessary to encourage local acts of terrorism. 
Tina S. Kaidanow, top counterterrorism official 
for the U.S. State Department, concluded that “the 
Islamic State’s unprecedented ability to recruit and 
to radicalize followers over the Internet and on 
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social media” will continue that trend (Schmitt & 
Senguptasept, 2015, September 27, p. A1).  
 In predicting the future of conflict, Peter W. Singer, 
director of the Center for 21st Century Security 
and Intelligence, drew this comparison: “Just as 
the Crimea War was the first war reported by 
telegraph and Vietnam the first TV war, we are 
now seeing wars in places like Syria and Iraq, just 
like the broader use of media technology, playing 
out online” (Ajbaili, 2014, June 24). And, just as 
the introduction of the new technologies of the 
telegraph and television altered the way audiences 
participated in warfare, the latest information 
and communication technologies have once again 
changed the relationship of audiences to war. 
In the future, critics must analyze the emerging 
technologies of netwar to fully understand the 
shifting contexts of conflicts. The images that swirl 
across digital forums have become an important 
part of twenty-first century conflict, allowing 
recruiters to target women and girls by bringing 
revolution directly into their lives, often playing 
on their desire for sisterhood and romance while 
obscuring all the ways they might become victims 
of violence should they decide to join the Islamic 
State. 
The question, of course, is how to counter ISIS’s 
messaging targeted at women. What narratives 
of inclusion can the West offer young women 
who are marked as “other” through experiences 
of racism or Islamophobia in their daily lives? 
This is a particularly potent question as the 
idea of multiculturalism in Europe has largely 
been deemed a failure and as the recent political 
climate in the United States makes Muslims a 
target for extremists. If ISIS offers a way to escape 
oppression as well as find romance, it may be time 
to ask why the Muslim women who choose to join 
the Islamic State cannot find personal fulfilment in 
the West. 
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1 Much of the ISIS and Al Qaeda material we base 
our essay on has been archived at the website 
Jihadology.net. Run by scholar Aaron Y. Zelin, the 
site serves as a clearinghouse of jihadi produced 
material and features uploads of videos as well as 
the text of particular recruitment messages and 
sometimes PDFs of recruitment materials. One 
example of this is the posting of PDFs of issues of 
the Al Qaeda affiliated women’s magazine 
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Your Home, including this one posted September 
1, 2019: https://jihadology.net/2019/09/01/new-
magazine-issue-released-your-home-20/. Other 
material was found circulating in social media, 
but the links to particular posts have been lost 
as accounts have been shut down – either by site 
administrators working to curb extremist material 
or by individuals who, for one reason or another, 
decide to disengage from publicly disseminating 
ISIS material.
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